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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Adaria, the Republic of Bobbia, the Kingdom of Cazalia,
the Commonwealth of Dingoth, the State of Ephraim, and the Kingdom of
Finbar submit the present dispute to this Court by Special Agreement, dated
September 1,2006, pursuant to article 40(1) of the Court's Statute. The parties
have agreed to the contents of the Compromis submitted as part of the Special
Agreement. All states parties to this dispute have accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with article 36(2) of the Court's Statute.
All parties shall accept the judgment of this Court as final and binding and shall
execute it in good faith in its entirety.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A) Whether the Rotian Union Councils decision to postpone
Adaria's admission breached any international legal obligations
owed to Adaria by Respondents;
B) Whether Respondents have standing to bring a claim against
Adaria in this Court for its actions against the Rotian Union
Legation, its property and its personnel;
C) Whether Adaria violated international law governing the
immunity of international organizations by invading the
premises and seizing the property and personnel of the Rotian
Union Legation;
D) Whether the National Industry Act constitutes an illegal
expropriation under international law.
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Republic of Bobbia, the Kingdom of Cazalia, the Commonwealth of
Dingoth, and the State of Ephraim (Respondents) are five contiguous and
economically developed States in the region of Rotia. In 1964, Respondents
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formed the Rotian Union (RU) in order to foster greater economic cooperation
and promote closer political unity within Rotia. The Treaty establishing the
Rotian Union (TRU) provided for four RU organs:
1) The Parliament, directly elected by the citizens of the Member
States;
2) The Council, composed of one representative from the
government of each Member State;
3) The Commission, consisting of a President and four ministers;
and
4) The High Court. (Compromis 4, 5, Annex I).
Respondents intended the RU to constitute a new legal order in
international law. Thus, they endowed it with a great deal of autonomy and
authority to enact legislation and further the objectives of the Union. Over the
next twenty-five years, the RU established common policies for its Member
States, supplanting domestic laws in numerous economic related spheres. The
High Court also actively brought offending states to task for not enacting
common legislation. Eventually, the RU began to act not only as a harmonizer
of economic relations between the Member States but also as a representative
of the Member States in dealing with non-Members. (Compromis 6, 8).
In 1991, Respondents signed the Convention Amending the Rotian Union
Treaty (CARUT) which further empowered the RU to coordinate non-trade
relations between Respondents and non-Member States. The CARUT also
replaced the national currencies of Respondents with a single Rotian currency,
the Roto. Since the CARUT entered into force, the role of the RU in
coordinating foreign policies of Respondents has grown considerably. For
example, in 1995, the RU negotiated mutual judgment recognition treaties with
the United States and India. In 1997, the RU became a party to the World
Trade Organization in its own right. Finally, in 2004, the President of the
Commission successfully negotiated for the safe release of nationals of Member
States held hostage by a paramilitary organization. (Compromis 9, 11, 12).
In 1995, the Republic of Adaria (Applicant) applied for RU membership.
Adaria is a neighboring country whose population comprises an Adarian
majority and a Sophian minority with its own unique cultural and religious
heritage. After reviewing Adaria's application, the Commission recommended
that Adaria would be suitable for membership if it:
1) Reduced its public debt owed to non-RU states;
2) Privatized state-owned monopolies; and
3) Eliminated government support payments to small, privately
owned businesses.
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These conditions were incorporated into the Adarian Accession Agreement
(AAA) which was ratified by the Council in 2000. The AAA provided that
Adaria would be "eligible for admission" if it met those conditions.
(Compromis 7 14, 15, Annex 1I).
The treaty further provided for the establishment of an RU Legation in
Adaria, the rights, privileges, and immunities of which would be governed by
international law. On February 1, 2002, in accordance with the AAA, the RU
opened a Permanent Legation in Adaria led by an experienced diplomat Uriah
Heep. At that time, the Adarian Prime Minister warmly welcomed Mr. Heep
and his staff "as the Representatives of the Rotian Union in Adaria."
(Compromis 18, Annex II).
Initially, the AAA received much popular support from Adaria and its
people. However, as the Adarian government took steps to meet its obligations,
support waned considerably. Among these steps were an increase in taxes to
pay off national debts and the privatization of state-owned industries through
public auctions. These industries were subsequently purchased by companies
based within the RU. In each case, the parent company integrated its Adarian
facilities into its existing infrastructure resulting in inevitable layoffs. The
newly privatized power and utility companies also modernized pricing so as to
charge all consumers the same rates. (Compromis 21)
At the same time, the Adarian government began to phase out support
payments to small businesses. The loss of these payments forced many
Sophians out ofbusiness. In 2003, the government announced a massive public
works program which was to provide employment for the Sophians.
Unfortunately, and as the Adarian government was well aware, this form of
employment was not suitable for the Sophians as their religion prohibited heavy
labor and road-building. (Compromis 77 22, 23; Clarification 1)
Nevertheless, Adaria continued implementing measures on its own accord
resulting in the increasing dissatisfaction of the Adarians. In November 2005,
the Commission President reported to the Council that Adaria had met the
obligations enumerated in the AAA. However, while Adaria had literally
satisfied these conditions, in the process it had failed to take care of its own
Sophian citizens. Concerned that a country which left its own citizens without
adequate water, electricity, or jobs would not live up to RU standards, the
Council voted to postpone Adaria's admission until it could demonstrate its
willingness and ability to adequately care for its people. (Compromis 7 24-28)
This announcement was not well received and within days a wave of retaliation
swept through Adaria. On December 16, Ambassador Uriah Heep was arrested
for allegedly making illegal political donations. Armed Adarian agents entered
Legation premises without the RUs consent and forcibly took Ambassador
Heep into custody. The RU immediately protested this action as a violation of
the Legation's diplomatic status. On December 17, more armed agents stormed
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the Legation offices seizing bank records and computer diskettes, again without
the RUs consent. The Adarian Attorney General has yet to present formal
charges against any RU personnel. (Compromis 29, 31-32, 34)
On December 17, the Adarian Parliament also passed the National Industry
Act (NIA) which prohibits the RU owners of formerly state-owned enterprises
from transferring any profits earned in Adaria outside of the country. One of
these RU companies brought a lawsuit in Adarian civil court alleging that its
property had been expropriated. However, the lawsuit was rejected by the court
which perfunctorily concluded that no expropriation had occurred. On appeal,
the Adarian Supreme Court upheld the ruling. (Compromis, 29-32, 35-36)
On April 20,2006, Adaria filed an application with this Court alleging that
the Respondents violated international law by denying Adaria admission to the
RU. In order to promote judicial efficiency, Respondents have decided to act
through common counsel in this case. On September 1, 2006, both parties
submitted a Compromis which contains a stipulation of agreed facts. The Court
has decided to hear this case. (Compromis 37-38)
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A) The Court is not competent to decide this dispute because the
issue of whether the Rotian Union (RU) should have admitted
Adaria to membership is not capable of resolution by legal
principles. Even if the Court were to find that Adaria's claim is
justiciable, it should find that Respondents have not breached
any legal obligations owed to Adaria. Neither the AAA nor
customary international law obligates Respondents or the RU to
admit Adaria to membership. Rather, the AAA grants the RU
Council the discretion to determine whether Adaria should be
admitted. The Council properly considered the situation of the
Sophians when it decided not to admit Adaria. Moreover,
Respondents are not responsible for any violation of the AAA
which the RU might have committed. First, the RU assumed
obligations under the AAA in its own right. Second,
Respondents neither assisted nor directed the RU in its decision
not to admit Adaria. Finally, Respondents have not consented
to be responsible for the RUs actions;
B) Respondents have standing to assert a claim against Adaria for
its violation of the RU Legation's right to functional immunity.
Under this Court's precedent, Respondents have a direct legal
interest in the enforcement of legal obligations owed to
international organizations which they have created. As the
RUs right to functional immunity derives from the mutual
respect other states owe to Respondents, the Respondents have
also suffered moral injury as a result of Adaria's breach of the
RU Legation's immunity. Moreover, Respondents have
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standing to assert the RUs claim for the breach of its functional
immunity. As Respondents have not explicitly granted the RU
the power to assert claims against states, they retain the power
to assert claims on its behalf. The purpose of this Court would
also be served by a policy allowing Member States to bring
claims on behalf of their international organizations;
C) Adaria violated the functional immunity of the RU Legation by
storming its premises and seizing its property and personnel.
Both the AAA and customary international law required Adaria
to afford the RU Legation functional immunity. Functional
immunity requires, at a minimum, respect for the inviolability
of an international organization's premises, property, and
personnel. The RU Legation did not waive this immunity. The
Legation's financial contributions to Adarian politicians fell
within its duty to facilitate Adaria's integration into the RU.
These contributions were also consistent with Adarian law as
the RU Legation is a diplomatic mission of an international
organization. Adaria's unannounced invasion of the RU
Legation office and its arrest of Ambassador Heep constitute a
blatant violation of this functional immunity;
D) The National Industry Act (NIA) illegally expropriation
property owned by corporations from Respondent States. In
completelyprohibiting RU-based corporations fromutilizing the
profits from their recently-acquired Adarian industries, the NIA
unreasonably interferes with Respondents' nationals' right to
use and enjoy their property. This expropriation is illegal
because it is a discriminatory measure of political retaliation
against the RU and because the NIA fails to provide any
compensation.
V. PLEADINGS
A. Respondents Have Not Breached Any Legal Obligations Owed to Adaria.
1. The Court is not competent to resolve this dispute because it involves a
non-justiciable political question.
This Court may only decide upon "legal disputes" between states.' A legal
dispute is one that does not turn upon political considerations, but rather is
"capable of being settled by the application of principles and rules of
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 2, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993
[hereinafter I.C.J. Statute] (emphasis added). See also Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J.
15, 33-34 (Dec. 15); Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Gr. v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11
(Aug. 30).
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international law."2 The question of whether the RUs denial of Adaria's
application for membership was proper is not capable of resolution by legal
principles. Thus, the Court is not empowered to resolve this dispute.
International organizations admit states to membership on the basis of
political, rather than legal, criteria.3 Because states create international
organizations to serve certain functions,4 the decision to admit another state into
an organization turns upon a political evaluation of whether that state's
admission would advance the purposes of the organization.5 Such decisions
cannot be reviewed by courts. For example, the Treaty of the European Union
(TEU) provides that the conditions for admission to European Union (EU)
membership must be decided upon in each particular case.6 The TEU does not
provide the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with the jurisdiction to hear
disputes over membership admissions decisions.7 Likewise, the ECJ has treated
questions regarding admission to EU membership as nonjusticiable.8 While this
Court's decision in the first Admission case may suggest that questions
regarding admission to UN membership are justiciable, its analysis is limited
to the particular facts of that case which involved the interpretation of Article
4 of the UN Charter.9
Unlike the UN, but similar to the EU, the RU is free to determine its own
criteria for the admission of new members.' As opposed to the UN which has
the goal of universal membership," the RU is a regional organization designed
2. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v.Hond.) 1988 .C.J.69,91 (Dec. 20). See also
PAUL REUTER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 236 (1958).
3. See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 71 (May 28) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez); C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES
OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 107 (2d ed 2005); HENRY G. SCHERMERS
& NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW § 99 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter SCHERMERS];
IAN BROWLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (6th ed. 2003); JAN KLABBERS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 108 (2002); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLMCAL ORGANS OF THE UNITEDNATIONS 12 (1963); SIR HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 149 (1958).
4. See, e.g., Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the ffff, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 179 (April 11).
5. See Conditions ofAdmission, 1948 I.C.J. at 85 (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Basdevant,
Winiarski, McNair & Read); SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 99; REUTER, supra note 2, at 224.
6. Treaty on European Union art. 49, adopted as part ofTreaty of Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.
C 224/1 [hereinafter TEU].
7. Id. art. 35.
8. Lothar Mattheus v. Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkfihlkost eG, Case 93/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2203.
9. See Conditions ofAdmission, 1948 I.C.J. at 61.
10. Compare U.N. Charter art. 4 with TEU, supra note 6, art. 49 and Compromis, Annex I
art. 11 (2)-(4).
11. See Conditions ofAdmission, 1948 I.C.J. at 71 (separate opinion ofJudge Alvarez); BENEDErO
CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 26 (2nd ed. 2000); GEORG
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to foster greater economic and political unity within Rotia. 12 Furthermore,
unlike the UN Charter which specifies criteria which are sufficient for
admission, 3 the TRU vests the Commission with the power to establish
admission criteria and the Council with the power to determine whether such
criteria have been satisfied. 4 As with EU membership decisions, there are no
legal standards by which this Court can judge the RUs denial of Adaria's
application. Thus, this dispute does not belong before the Court.
2. Even if Applicant's claim is justiciable, the RU did not violate any legal
obligations when it exercised its discretion not to admit
Adaria to RU membership.
a. The RU did not breach the AAA by finding Adaria
ineligible for RU membership.
In order for the RU to breach an international obligation to admit Adaria
to RU membership, such an obligation would have to exist either under the
AAA or as a rule of customary international law. 5 In Yeda.; Tarim v. Council,
the European Court of First Instance (CFI) held that the Ankara Agreement,
which was designed to promote balanced economic relations between the
European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, did not create an
obligation for the EEC to financially support Turkey in any particular way. 6
Rather, as the Agreement was "not sufficiently precise and unconditional and
[was] of necessity subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of
subsequent measures,"' 7 the CFI found that the treaty granted the EEC a
substantial amount of discretion in its implementation. 8 Indeed, the EEC has
on multiple occasions entered into financial agreements with Turkey designed
to more closely align Turkey's economic policies with those of the EEC, but to
date the EEC has made no formal commitment to admit Turkey to the EU.' 9
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS VOL.
1II 133 (1976).
12. Compromis, Annex I.
13. See U.N. Charter art. 4; Conditions of Admission, 1948 I.C.J. at 65; OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1271-73 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM].
14. See Compromis, Annex I art. 11, para. 6.
15. See MOSHE HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARDTHIRD
PARTIES 102-3 (1995); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 47 (1994).
16. Yeda§ Tarim v. Council & Comm'n, Case T-367/03, Mar. 30, 2006, at 342.
17. Id.
18. Id. at % 55-6.
19. See Financial Protocol Annexed to the Agreement Establishing the Association Between the
European Economic Community and Turkey, Nov. 23, 1973, 1972 O.J. (L 293) 4; Council Decision
concerning the conclusion of a Financial Protocol between the European Economic Community an Turkey,
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Just as the Ankara Agreement created no precise obligation for the EEC
to financially support Turkey, the AAA does not obligate the RU to admit
Adaria to membership, but rather grants the Council final discretion to
determine whether Adaria should be admitted. The terms of the AAA must be
interpreted "in accordance with [their] ordinary meaning."20 The AAA only
guarantees that "Adaria shall be eligible for admission" upon its completion of
the three conditions specified therein.2' Likewise, the TRU provides that after
"the applicant state has timely satisfied all the conditions for accession
described in the Accession Agreement, the Council shall consider the
application, which it may approve by unanimous vote after obtaining the
opinion of Parliament."22 Thus, Adaria's fulfillment of the accession conditions
was necessary, but not sufficient for becoming an RU member. The Council
retained final discretion to determine whether Adaria should be admitted.
The Council properly exercised this discretion when it denied Adaria's
application because of concerns over the living conditions of the Sophians.
International organizations generally consider a membership applicant's ability
to help advance the unique purposes and goals of the organization when
deciding whether to admit it.23 The RU was formed, in part, "to ensure the
development of [its Member States'] prosperity, in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including in particular respect
for human rights and the rights of women and minorities."24 When evaluating
Adaria's application, the Council properly considered Adaria's treatment of its
Sophian minority. Adaria's failure to ensure that its Sophian citizens had
adequate water, electricity, and economic opportunities25 rightly caused the
Council to question whether Adaria should be an RU member.26 Thus, its
denial of Adaria's application for membership was consistent with its
obligations under the AAA.
Mar. 5, 1979, 1979 O.J. (L 67) 14.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations art. 31, March 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 129/15 (1986), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) (emphasis added) [hereinafter VCLTSIO]. AccordVienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (March 3);
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 194-95 (July 20).
21. Compromis, Annex 1 1 (emphasis added).
22. Compromis, Annex I art. 11(6) (emphasis added).
23. See Statute of the Council of Europe art. 4, May 5, 1949,87 U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter Council
of Europe Statute]; SCHERMERS, supra note 3, §§ 95, 97, 99.
24. Compromis, Annex I (emphasis added).
25. See Compromis % 21, 23, 26, 28; Clarifications IM 1-2.
26. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, Dee. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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b. The RU did not violate any rule of customary international law in its
treatment ofAdaria's application for RU membership.
No customary rule of international law requires the RU to admit Adaria.
Admission to membership in an international organization is not governed by
customary international law. Rather, as Professor Amerasinghe has observed,
"matters concerning membership depend primarily on the provisions of the
constitutions of international organizations and on the practice of each
organization. '2 7 Furthermore, Adaria bears the burden of demonstrating to the
Court the existence of a custom regarding admission.28 Adaria cannot meet that
burden for two reasons. First, there is no widespread or consistent practice of
states2 9 regarding admission to membership in international organizations as the
procedures for accession to membership vary with each organization.3" Second,
states share no opiniojuris" regarding the legal obligation to admit states which
satisfy conditions in accession agreements. For example, the UN does not
require accession agreements.32 Indeed, Security Council members have vetoed
for political reasons the admission of applicants who have otherwise satisfied
the Article 4 conditions.33 Likewise, the EU and the Council of Europe admit
new members only if all Member States politically agree upon the admission.34
27. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 105. See also KLABBERS, supra note 3, at 105; KONRAD G.
BUHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 19(2001); Ebere Sieke,
Admission to Membership in International Organizations: the Case ofNamibia, 51 BRIT. Y. B. INT'LL. 190,
192 (1980); Felice Morgenstern, Legality in International Organizations, 48 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 241,244
(1976).
28. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (Nov. 30).
29. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20).
30. Compare TEU, supra note 6, art. 49 with North Atlantic Treaty art. 10, Apr. 4, 1949, 34
U.N.T.S. 243 andConstitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization art. II, Oct. 16,1945, 12 U.S.T. 980
and Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. IV, Oct. 23, 1956, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. See also
Sieke, supra note 27, at 189.
31. See North Sea Continental Shelf 1969 I.C.J. at 42.
32. U.N. Charter art. 4.
33. See U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1836th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIPV. 1836 (Aug. 11,1975); U.N. SCOR,
30th Sess., 1846th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1846 (Sept. 30, 1975). See also SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 96;
KLABBERS, supra note 3, at 110; MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 46
(2001); FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 144,146 (2d ed.
1993); Stephen Jacobs & Marc Poirier, The Right to Veto Untied Nations Membership Applications: The
United States Veto of the Viet-Nams, 17 HARv. INT'L L. J. 581 (1976).
34. See TEU, supra note 6, art. 49; Council of Europe Statute, supra note 23, art. 4; Eur. Parl. Ass.
Res. 1055 (Feb. 2, 1995); Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1089 (May 29, 1996); Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1102 (Nov. 7, 1996).
See also MAURICE FITZGERALD, PROTECTIONISM TO LIBERALISATION: IRELAND ANDTHE EEC 224-27(2001);
Richard Davis, The 'Problem of de Gaulle': British Reactions to General de Gaulle's Veto of the UK
Application to Join the Common Market, 32 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 453 (1997); Evelyne Gelin, L 'Adhesion de
la Russie au Conseil de l'Europe a la Lumiere de la Crise Tchetchene, 99 REV. GEN. PUB. INT'L L. 623, 638
(1995).
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Even in cases where accession agreements govern admission to the
organization, Professor Amerasinghe has concluded that:
[I]t would not be appropriate to speak of a legal obligation to admit
an applicant that fulfills the necessary conditions, since the applicant
cannot be said to fulfill the conditions until the members have decided
that it does, and some of the conditions are subjective, depending on
the judgment of the organization.35
In other words, there is no automatic right in international law to be admitted
to an international organization, even when a state satisfies the conditions of an
accession agreement.36 Thus, the RU was not obliged to admit Adaria to
membership as a matter of custom.
3. Respondents are not responsible for any internationally wrongful acts the
RU may have committed.
a. Respondents are not directly responsible for the RUs actions because the
R U assumes obligations independently from Respondents by virtue of its
separate international legal personality.
Under international law, international organizations possess separate legal
personality37 and are independently responsible for their own acts.38 In the
Reparations case, this Court found that international organizations "exercis[e]
and enjo[y] functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the
possession of a large measure of international legal personality and the capacity
to operate on the international plane., 39 Considering whether non-Member
States must recognize this personality, the Court held that the Member States
of the UN "had the power in conformity with international law, to bring into
being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely
35. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 107.
36. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 11, at 30-31.
37. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 18-19; Esa Paasivirta, The European Union: From an
Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 41 (1997); James E. Hickey, Jr.,
The Source of International Legal Personality in the 21 st Century, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 1,5 (1997);
Finn Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 34 NORDISK
TiDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L RET. 1, 45 (1964).
38. See Gerhard Hafner, Can International Organizations Be Controlled? Accountability and
Responsibility, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 236 (2003); Christian Tomuschat, The International
Responsibility of the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
179 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2002); Finn Seyersted, The Legal Nature of International Organizations, 51
NORDISK TIDSSKRJFr FOR INT'L RET. 203, 205 (1982).
39. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 179 (April 11).
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personality recognized by them alone."'4 Similarly, the EU and the EC have
objective legal personality which other states must recognize."t
Like the UN and the EU, the RU possesses objective international legal
personality. This personality is evidenced by the fact that the RU has entered
into treaties with states, negotiated with other states concerning the protection
of RU nationals, and become a member of another international organization,
the World Trade Organization.42 Adaria has also implicitly recognized the RUs
independent legal personality by entering into a treaty with it.43
One of the major incidents of an organization's possession of legal
personality is the ability to assume international obligations in its own right by
entering into treaties.' When an international organization enters into such a
treaty, the organization itself, not its Member States, assumes the treaty
obligations.45 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between states
and International Organizations (VCLTSIO), to which both Adaria and
Respondents are parties,46 provides that such a treaty "does not create either
rights or obligations for a third state or a third organization without the consent
of that state or organization." '47 Obligations for a third state to such a treaty can
only arise "if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of
establishing the obligation and the third state expressly accepts that obligation
in writing."'48 While the drafters of the VCLTSIO considered including an
Article 36bis which would have made treaty commitments of international
organizations automatically binding upon Member States, they expressly
rejected this approach as inconsistent with international law.49
40. Id. at 185.
41. See Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R.
105, 129; Comm'n v. Council, Case 22/70, 1970 E.C.R. 263,267; TREVOR C. HARTLEY, EUROPEAN UNION
LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 217 (2004); Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 luS GENTIIJM
35,36(2005); Maria Gavouneli, International Law Aspects ofthe European Union, 8TUL. JANTL&COMP.
L. 147, 148 (2000).
42. Compromis IM 9, 12.
43. Id. at 15.
44. See Report of International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Second Session, U.N.
Doc. A/45/1 0, pp. 84-89 (July 20, 1990); Rosalyn Higgins, Report on the Legal Consequences for Member
States of the Non-fullfillment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties, 1
Y.B. INST. INT'L L. 252 (1995).
45. See SCHARF, supra note 33, at 44 (2001); Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 179; Finn Seyersted,
United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 351, 450 (1961).
46. Compromis 40.
47. VCLTSIO, supra note 20, art. 34.
48. VCLTSIO, supra note 20, art. 35 (emphasis added).
49. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session,
[1982] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A1I982/Add.1; Giorgio Gaja, A "New" Vienna
Convention on Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations: A Critical Commentary, 58 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 253,263-64 (1987); Tomuschat, supra note
38, at 179.
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As the AAA was a treaty between Adaria and the RU,5" it created rights
and obligations only for Adaria and the RU, and not for Respondents. Neither
the RU nor Respondents intended the AAA to create any obligation for Respon-
dents since, under the TRU, the RU Council, not Respondents, is responsible
for the accession process." Likewise, no provision in the treaty identifies any
obligations owed to Adaria by Respondents. Because the RU assumed
obligations under the AAA in its own right, Respondents cannot be responsible
for any violations which the RU may have committed.
b. Respondents are not concurrently responsible for the RUs violations of
its legal obligations because they have not consented to be held responsible.
As this Court's President, Rosalyn Higgins, has observed "there is no
general rule of international law whereby states members are, due solely to their
membership, liable concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an
international organization of which they are members."52 The constituent
treaties of many international organizations clarify that Member States are not
responsible for the organization's legal liabilities by expressly disclaiming such
responsibility.53 Moreover, in the International Tin Council case, the British
House of Lords found that the Member States of the International Tin Council
(ITC) could not be held liable for the ITCs failure to pay financial obligations
which it owed to third parties.54 The ITC was created by thirty-two states to
buy and sell tin on the world market for the purpose of keeping the prices
stable.5 When the ITC went bankrupt in 1985, several creditors attempted to
recover their debts by suing the Member States. 6 In the Court of Appeals
decision, Lord Kerr could not "find any basis for concluding that.., there is
any rule of international law, binding on the member states of the ITC, whereby
they can be held liable, let alone jointly and severally .... for the debts...
resulting from contracts concluded by the ITC in its own name."57 Writing for
the majority in the House of Lords, Lord Templeman likewise reasoned that
there was "no support" for the proposition that "a contract by the ITC involves
a concurrent, direct, or guarantee liability on the members joint and
50. Compromis, Annex U.
51. Compromis, Annex I art. 11.
52. See SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 1585; Higgins, supra note 44, at 251.
53. See MacLaine Watson & Co. Ltd. v. Int'l Tin Council, [1989] 1 Ch. 72, 253 (Annex to
Judgement of Kerr L.J.). See also Higgins, supra note 44, at 252; C.F. Amerasinghe, Liability to Third
Parties of Member States of International Organizations: Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 260 (1991).
54. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., et al. v. Australia, 29 I.L.M. 670, 674 (U.c
House of Lords 1989).
55. Id. at 680.
56. Id. at 690.
57. MacLaine Watson & Co., [1989] 1 Ch. 72, at 253.
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severally."58 Just as the ITC Member States were not responsible by virtue of
their ITC membership, Respondents, as RU member states, are not responsible
for any violations of legal obligations which the RU may have committed.
The International Law Commission (ILC), a group of distinguished
publicists charged with the codification of customary international law,59 has
likewise found that Member States of international organizations are not
concurrently responsible for the actions of their organization simply by virtue
of their membership. As the law of state responsibility does not address the
issue of the responsibility of Member States for the actions of international
organizations," the TLC codified the emerging rules in this area in its Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (Draft Articles).6'
These articles identify only four ways in which a Member State may be
responsible for an internationally wrongful act of the organization. 2 First, a
state may be responsible if it knowingly "aids or assists an international
organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act."63 Second,
a state may be responsible if it "directs and controls an international
organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act."' Third, a
state may be responsible if it "coerces an international organization" to commit
such an act. 5 Finally, a Member State is responsible for the acts of the organi-
zation if "[i]t has accepted responsibility for that act or it has led the injured
party to rely on its responsibility."66 As Respondents have not consented to be
responsible for the acts of the RU and have neither aided, directed, or coerced
the RU in its actions, they are not responsible for any internationally wrongful
acts the RU might have committed.
Respondents have never coerced the RU to act in any way. Similarly,
Respondents neither directed nor assisted the RU in its consideration of
Adaria's application for RU membership. In exercising its discretion regarding
whether to admit Adaria to membership, the Council acted in its own right as
58. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group, 29 I.L.M. at 674.
59. See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 46 (Sept. 25); Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 158 (July 20); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 292 (2001); R.Y. Jennings, Recent Developments in the International Law
Commission: Its Relation to the Sources of International Law, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 385, 386 (1964).
60. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 57,
International Law Commission, U.N. GA 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
61. Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, Commentary, locatedin Report
of International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, at pp. 246-92
(Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Draft Articles of Responsibility of International Organizations].
62. ld. at 261-262.
63. Id. at 261.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 262.
66. Id.
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an organ of the RU.67 While Respondents may have had representatives on the
Council, these representatives acted solely in their capacity as Council members
and not as instruments of Respondents. The ILCs Commentary to the Draft
Articles explains that if the state is a member of the organization "the influence
that may amount to aid or assistance [can]not simply consist in participation in
the decision-making processes of the organization according to the pertinent
rules of the organization."6 Likewise, the Commentary draws a distinction
"between participation by a member State in the decision-making process of the
organization according to its pertinent rules, and direction or control which
would trigger" responsibility.69 Because Respondents' only participation, if
any, in the Council's decision not to admit Adaria was due to the RU rules of
procedure,7" Respondents cannot be considered to have directed or assisted the
RU. Respondents also never consented to be held liable for the RUs actions.
Thus, Respondents are not responsible for any internationally wrongful acts the
RU is alleged to have committed.
B. Respondents Have Standing to Assert A Claim Against Adaria's For Its
Violation of the R U Legation's Immunity.
1. Respondents have a direct legal interest in Adaria's violation of the RU
legation's immunity.
a. Respondents as R U Member States have a direct interest in the
enforcement of legal obligations owed to the RU.
In the jurisdictional phase of the South West Africa case, this Court
recognized that Member States of international organizations have a legal
interest in the enforcement of obligations owed to the organization by other
states.7 The case involved a claim brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against
South Africa for violations of the Mandate Agreement for South West Africa,
which had been negotiated between the League of Nations (League) and South
Africa.72 South Africa objected on the grounds that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked
standing because South Africa's alleged mismanagement of the territory
affected no material interests of the two states.7" The Court held that the
67. See Finn Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations,
34 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L RET. 1, 41-43 (1964).
68. Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 61, at 279, 281.
69. Id.
70. Compromis 27-28, Annex I art. 11 (6), Annex lI.
71. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.), Jurisdiction Phase, 1962 I.C.J. 319,
342-44 (Dec. 21).
72. Id. at 321.
73. Id. at 342-43.
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applicants had standing by virtue of their membership in the League.74 In
particular, the Court reasoned that League members "have a legal right or
interest in the observance by the Mandatory of its obligations both toward the
inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations and
its Members."75 In his separate opinion, Judge Jessup clarified that "this case
establishes... that a state may have a legal interest in the observance, in the
territories of another state, of general welfare treaty provisions and that it may
assert such interest without alleging any impact upon its own nationals or its
direct so-called tangible or material interests."76
Just as Ethiopia and Liberia had an interest in South Africa's performance
of the legal obligations owed to the League, Respondents, as members of the
RU, have a legal interest in Adaria's respect for the immunity guaranteed the
RU Legation under the AAA. Like Ethiopia and Liberia who were concerned
that South Africa was not administering South West Africa consistent with its
Mandate obligations, Respondents have protested Adaria's failure to afford the
RU Legation immunity under international law.77 Moreover, as Judge
Skubiszewski stated in the East Timor case, "to have jus standi before the
Court, it is enough to show direct concern in the outcome of the case."78
Because the RU represents the political and economic unity of Respondents,
Adaria's failure to respect the RU Legation's immunity directly concerns
Respondents.
b. Respondents have also suffered moral injury as a result of Adaria's
violation of the R U Legation's immunity.
In his separate opinion in the South West Africa case, Judge Jessup
observed that "[i]nternational law has long recognized that states may have
legal interests in matters which do not affect their financial, economic, or other
'material', or, say 'physical' or 'tangible' interests."79 One of these tradition-
ally recognized legal interests is the moral injury a state suffers when another
state fails to give it due respect as a co-equal sovereign."° One of the primary
ways in which a state suffers moral injury is through "wrongs to diplomatic
74. Id. at 343.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 428 (separate opinion of Judge Jessup).
77. Compromis 33.
78. East Timor (Port. v. Aust.) 1995 I.C.J. 90, 225 (June 30) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Skubiszewski).
79. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Aft.), Jurisdiction Phase, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 425
(Dec. 21) (separate opinion of Judge Jessup).
80. See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSrBILrrY PART 1199-200
(1983); Jodi Wexler, The Rainbow Warrior Affair: State andAgent Responsibilityfor Authorized Violations
of International Law, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 389, 403.
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missions and the like."'" Numerous international tribunals, including this
Court, have recognized moral injury as a basis for awarding compensation to
an injured state. 2
Adaria's failure to accord the RU Legation immunity violates its obliga-
tion to respect the co-equal sovereign status of Respondents. In the Reparations
case, this Court suggested that because international organizations are created
by states, the respect that other states must afford these organizations derives
from the respect they owe to the Member States which created the organiza-
tion. 3 States accord an organization immunity with respect its functions
because the organization performs these functions to serve the interests of its
Member States.84 Thus, just as an injury to a state's citizen involves the
violation of "an obligation towards the national state in respect of its
nationals,'" an injury to an international organization constitutes a moral injury
to the Member States. Here, Respondents suffered moral injury because Adaria
failed show proper respect to the Legation of an international organization
which they created.
2. Respondents can also assert claims before this
Court on behalf of the RU.
Because Respondents have not expressly delegated the right to assert
claims to the RU, they, as Member States which created the RU, retain the right
to assert claims on its behalf. Under principles of the institutional law of
international organizations, "international organizations are competent to act
only as far as powers have been attributed to them by member states."8 6 As
Respondents have not expressly given the RU the power to bring claims against
states," they have retained for themselves the right to assert claims regarding
the violations of the RUs rights before this Court.
Respondent's retention of the right to assert the RUs claims is consistent
with this Court's Statute. Article 34(1) of the Statute clarifies that "[o]nly
States may be parties in cases before the Court." 8 However, Article 34(2)
81. BROWNLIE, supra note 80, at 236.
82. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 14); Borchgrave
(Beig. v. Sp.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C), No. 85, at 37; Rainbow Warrior (Fr. v. N.Z.) 82 I.L.R. 500 (Fr.-N.Z.
Arbitration Tribunal 1990).
83. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 185 (April 11).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 181.
86. SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 209. See also AMERASINGHE, supra note 3,135,138; KLABBERS,
supra note 3, at 63; RACHEL FRID, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
47 (1995); Pierre Pescatore, Relations Extirieures Des Communates, 103 RECUEIL DES COuRS 219 (1961).
87. Compromis, Annex I.
88. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 23, art. 34(1).
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contemplates that international organizations may have legal interests involved
in the disputes by explicitly allowing the Court to "request of public inter-
national organizations information relevant to cases before it." 9 Early judges
of the Court, including Judge Jessup, also recognized that international organi-
zations would have claims against states that should be presented to the Court.90
The ability of Member States to bring claims on behalf of their organizations
solves this problem.
The notion that Member States may bring claims on behalf of international
organizations is also consistent with this Court's approach to standing in the
East Timor case.9' One of the issues raised in the case was whether Portugal
had standing to assert claims against Australia on behalf of the people of East
Timor.92 While the Court did not directly decide the question of Portugal's
standing because it was able to dispose of the case on other grounds,93 several
judges suggested that states could have standing to assert the claims of other
international legal persons.94 According to these judges, the only problem with
Portugal's standing was that the East Timorese people had not consented to
have Portugal assert their claim.95 Here, the RU has consented to have
Respondents assert its claim against Adaria. Thus, Respondents have standing
to bring the RUs claim before the Court.
C. Adaria Violated International Law Governing The Immunity of
International Organizations By Seizing The Premises, Property, And
Personnel Of The R U Legation.
1. Adaria is obligated to accord the RU Legation functional
immunity under international law.
a. The RU Legation has functional immunity under both the AAA and
customary international law.
Under the AAA, Adaria agreed to accord the RU Legation "privileges and
immunities" as provided for "by international law." 96 Adaria further recognized
that it was obligated to afford the RU Legation such immunity when it accepted
the diplomatic credentials of Ambassador Heep and the other RU diplomatic
89. Id. art. 34(2).
90. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 25 (1948).
91. East Timor (Port. v. Aust.) 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
92. Id. at 99.
93. Id. at 105.
94. SeeId. at 135 (separate opinion ofJudge Vereshchetin); Id. at255 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Subiszewski).
95. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 135 (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin).
96. Compromis, Annex H 3.
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personnel.97 As international law generally requires respect for the premises,
property and personnel of international organizations,98 the AAA should be read
to incorporate such immunities.
Independently of the AAA, Adaria is obliged to afford the RU Legation
functional immunity as a matter of custom. In the Reparations case, this Court
found that international law grants international organizations immunity for the
purpose of ensuring their ability to perform the functions entrusted to them by
states.99 In the UNPrivileges andImmunities case, the Court also acknowledg-
ed that states may not establish an organization and fail to provide it with the
basic immunities that ensure its independence from its host state.' Likewise,
in Branno v. Ministry of War, the Italian Court of Cassation held that, even
absent conventional provisions, there exists a custom that protects the func-
tional immunity of international organizations.'' The court reaffirmed this
principle in FoodandAgriculture Organization v. Colagrossi, expressly stating
that "customary international law govern[s] the immunity of international
organizations."'' 2 Similarly, the Swiss Labor Court in Z.M. v. Permanent
Delegation of the League ofArab States to the UN held that "customary inter-
national law recognize[s] that international organizations, whether universal or
regional, enjoy absolute jurisdictional immunity."'0 3 The court explained that
"[t]his privilege arises from . . . the purposes and functions assigned to"
international organizations as "[t]hey can only carry out their tasks if they are
beyond the censure of' national courts.'04 The RU Legation thus had a right to
functional immunity under customary international law.
97. Compromis 18.
98. See infra Section III. A. 2. See generally AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 315; MALCOM N.
SHAW, UINTERNATIONAL LAW 1206 (4th ed., 2003); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 683.
99. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174,184 (April 11). See also Rosalyn Higgins, The Abuse ofPrivileges and Immunities: Recent United
Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 641,645 (1985).
100. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177, 192 (Dec. 15).
101. Branno v. Ministry of War, 22 I.L.R. 756, 757 (It. Cass. 1954). See also Waite and Kennedy
v. Germany, 116 I.L.R. 121, 134 (1999).
102. Food and Agriculture Organization v. Colagrossi, 101 I.L.R. 386,387 (It. Cass. 1992). See also
Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615-617 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 116
I.L.R. 121, 134 (Ger. 1999).
103. Z.M. v. Permanent Delegation of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, 116 I.L.R.
643, 647 (Switz. 1993).
104. Id.
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b. The RUs right to functional immunity required Adaria to respect the
inviolability of the Legation's premises, property and personnel.
The protection of premises, property, and personnel is universally recog-
nized as necessary for an international organization's independent exercise of
its functions and responsibilities.'° 5 For example, the American Restatement
of the Law of Foreign Relations provides that "an international organization
enjoys immunity from any exercise ofjurisdiction by a member state that would
interfere with official use by the organization of its premises, archives,
documents, or communications."' °6 This same immunity extends to officials as
well.10 7 Likewise, nearly all constituent treaties of international financial
organizations' 8 as well as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations (UN Convention) 109and the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (Specialized Agencies Convention)" 0
specifically provide for the protection of premises, property, and personnel.
The UN Convention and the Specialized Agencies Convention are so widely
ratified that they are considered to embody customary international law
regarding functional immunity."'
The UN Convention, the Specialized Agencies Convention, as well as
other treaties provide that the property and assets of the organizations shall be
immune from all forms ofjudicial process." 2 These conventions also require
that "the archives of [the organization] and, in general, all documents belonging
to it or held by it shall be inviolable wherever located.""' 3 This protection
105. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 346.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 469 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
107. Id.
108. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 39
[hereinafter IMF Articles]; Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
May 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1077 (1990) [hereinafter EBRD Articles]; Agreement Establishing the Inter-
American Development Bank, Apr. 8, 1959, 389 U.N.T.S. 69 [hereinafter IADB Agreement]; Agreement
Establishing the African Development Bank, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 14/AFDB (1964) [hereinafter ADB
Agreement]; Asian Development Bank Articles of Agreement, Dec. 4, 1965, 571 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter
Asian Agreement].
109. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S.
15 [hereinafter UN Convention].
110. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, 33
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Specialized Agencies Convention].
111. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 346.
112. See UN Convention, supra note 109, art. 2 §3; Specialized Agencies Convention, supra note
110, §5; IMF Articles, supra note 108, art. IX(4); EBRD Articles, supra note 108, art. 47; IADB Agreement,
supra note 108, art. XI(3); ADB Agreement, supra note 108, art. 52(2); Asian Agreement, supra note 108,
art. 50(3).
113. UN Convention, supra note 109, art. 2 §4. See also Specialized Agencies Convention, supra
note, 110, art. VI §5; IMF Articles art. IX(5); EBRD Agreement, supra note 108, art. 48; IADB Agreement,
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ensures the confidentiality of the organization's operations.14 The UN
Convention also provides that the premises of the UN shall be inviolable." 5
While there are no equivalent express provisions in other conventions or consti-
tuent treaties, protection of premises can be inferred from their various provi-
sions regarding the protection of property." 6 Specifically, these treaties'
prohibitions on searches and confiscations of property demonstrate that the
premises of the organizations are outside the reach of states." 7 Finally, these
conventions provide that the officials of international organizations shall be
immune from legal process. 118 This protection of personnel allows officials of
such organizations to fulfill their duties without fear of repercussions from the
host state.
c. The RU Legation did not waive its immunity as its actions were bothlawful and within its functions.
In FAO v INDPAI, the Italian Court of Cassation concluded that the test
for determining whether an act was within the functional immunity of an
organization is whether the purpose of the activity is directly connected with the
institutional aims normally pursued by the organization." 9 As agreed to by
Adaria in the AAA, the RU Legation was to aid in the diplomatic and economic
aspects of Adarian integration in to the RU. 2' In assisting states in the
accession process, international organizations often provide financial support
to pro-integration forces. For example, the EU through its Phare program has
consistently provided financial aid to less economically developed European
countries which seek admission to the EU.'2 ' Like the Phare program, the RU
Legation's contributions to pro-RU Adarian politicians served its purpose of
facilitating Adaria's integration into the RU.
supra note 108, art. XI(5); ADB Agreement, art. 53(2); Asian Agreement, supra note art. 52.
114. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 331.
115. UN Convention, supra note 109, art. H §3.
116. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 330.
117. See IMF Articles, supra note 108, art. IX(4); EBRD Agreement, supra note 108, art. 47; IADB
Agreement, supra note 108, art. XI(3); ADB Agreement, supra note 108, art. 52(2); Asian Agreement, supra
note 108, art. 50(3).
118. See UN Convention, supra note 109, § 18(a); Specialized Agencies Convention, supra note I 10,
§ 19(a); IMF Articles, supra note 108, art. IX(8)(i); EBRD, supra note 108, art. 51; IADB Agreement, supra
note 108, art. XI(8)(a); ADB Agreement, supra note 108, art. 56(l); Asian Agreement, supra note 108, art.
55(i).
119. FAOv. INPDAI, 87 I.L.R. 1, 6-7 (It. Cass.1982).
120. Compromis, Annex H 13.
121. See Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central
European and Mediterranean States, 1 LOY. INT'L L. REV. 15, 22 (2003).
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Moreover, the Legation's political contributions did not violate Adaria's
domestic laws. Section 17-1031 of the Adarian Civil Code only prohibits
political contributions from a "foreign business or corporate entity.' 22 The RU
Legation is neither a business nor corporate entity, but rather, as recognized by
Adaria's own prime minister, it is "the representative of the Rotian Union in
Adaria." 123 As the RU Legation was properly fulfilling its functions at all times
while in Adaria, it was entitled to functional immunity.
2. Adaria violated the RU Legation's functional immunity by
seizing its premises, property and personnel.
International law accords the property and archives of international
organizations very broad protection. 24 In Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v.
Int'l Tin Council the British House of Lords held that the ITC had the same
immunity for its archives as did diplomatic missions. 125  The Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that the documents of such
missions "shall be inviolable at any time wherever they may be."'26 The House
of Lords in Shearson also clarified that "archives" include all documents
belonging to or held by the organization. Adaria's seizure of the RU Legation's
bank records as well as other files clearly violated this immunity. 27
The personnel and premises of an international organization also enjoy
broad protection. under international law. For example, in 767 Third Avenue
Association v. Permanent Mission of Zaire, the United States Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a landlord could not forcibly enter the premises of
the Zaire Mission to evict its tenants for failure to pay rent even though the
landlord owned the building. 2 Here, Adaria not only stormed the RU Legation
without warning and without seeking its consent, but it also arrested
Ambassador Heep and imprisoned him for two days without filing any official
charges. 129 This blatant disrespect for the RUs premises and its personnel
should not be tolerated by the Court.
122. Compromis 30.
123. Compromis 18.
124. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 328.
125. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Int'l Tin Council (No. 2), 77 I.L.R. 107, 131 (U.K.H.L.
1987).
126. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 24, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
127. Shearson Lehman Brothers, 77 I.L.R. at 131.
128. 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire to the United
Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1993).
129. Compromis I 31, 33.
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D. Adaria's National Industry Act Illegally Expropriated Assets Owned by
Respondents' Nationals.
1. The NIA constitutes an expropriation of assets owned by the
Respondents' citizens.
Expropriation is not limited to a state's direct taking of assets but also
encompasses any "unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment or
disposal of property so as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not
be able to use, enjoy or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of
time after the inception of such interference."' 30 Thus, in Starret Housing
Corp. v. Iran, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal found that expropriation includes
any interference with property rights which renders those rights useless to the
owner." ' Indeed, any "covert or incidental interference" with the use of
property which deprives the owner of "the economic benefits of his property,
even if not to the obvious benefit of the State," is expropriation.' 32 To
determine whether a governmental action is expropriation, tribunals generally
consider:
I) The degree of interference with the property right;
2) The purpose and context of the governmental measures; and
3) The interference of the measure with reasonable and
investment-backed expectations.133
Interference with property ownership which substantially impairs the
owner's use or enjoyment of the property has consistently been found to be
expropriation. 34 In Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, the tribunal held that
Jamaica's decision to charge the applicant increased royalties was an
expropriation. 35 The tribunal reasoned that, even though the applicant still had
legal title to its property and was still able to operate its business, the govern-
mental action had effectively deprived the applicant of the right to control and
use its property.' 36 Similarly, in CME (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, the
130. Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens,
art. 10(5), reprinted in Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests ofAliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 548 (1961). See also BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 508; SHAW,
supra note 98, at 740.
131. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983).
132. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 616 I.L.R. 617, 639 (2000).
133. Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, OECD Doc.
No. 2004/4, 10 (2004) [hereinafter OECD Doc.].
134. Id. at l1.
135. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 56 I.L.R. 258, 259 (1980).
136. Id.
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tribunal found that the Czech National Media Council's restrictions on the use
of an exclusive license granted to the applicant's media company constituted
an expropriation because the restrictions destroyed the applicant's operations,
leaving the company "with assets, but without business."' 13 7
The NIA similarly deprives Respondents' nationals from using and
enjoying their investments in Adaria. Like the exorbitant increase in royalties
in Revere Copper which prevented applicant from deriving financial benefit
from his business in Jamacia, the NIAs absolute ban on capital transfers
prevents companies based in the RU from utilizing the profits of their Adarian
enterprises. Moreover, just as the license restrictions in CME technically left
the applicants with ownership of their assets but without a use for them, the
NIA prevents the RU corporations from enjoying the integration benefits of
their ownership of the formerly Adarian-run enterprises. Thus, Adaria has, for
all effective purposes, taken the property of Respondents' nationals.
While governments occasionally pass regulations which affect foreign
interests without amounting to expropriation, 3 ' the cases in which tribunals
have upheld such action involved laws which granted property owners much
greater freedom to manage their assets than does the NIA. For instance, in
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal upheld regulation which introduced
export quotas that resulted merely in a reduction of profits.'39 In contrast, the
NIA totally deprives RU corporations of the use of their profits made in Adaria.
In Starrett Housing, the detention of applicant's personnel which the Tribunal
upheld did not amount to a taking of property because it did not completely
deprive the asset owners of the right and ability to utilize and profit from their
assets. The NIA, on the other hand, leaves no such residual right to the RU-
based corporations, but rather absolutely prohibits the export of profits.
2. The NIA's expropriation of Respondents' nationals' assets is illegal
because it is discriminatory and does not provide for compensation.
As the UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(Resources Resolution)14 has been widely acknowledged by arbitral tribunals' 4
and publicists 42 as reflecting customary international law, it provides the
137. CME (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (Partial Award) (Sept. 13, 2001) available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001 PartialAward.pdf.
138. See OECD Doc., supra note 133, at 4; BROWNLIE,supra note 3, at 208.
139. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award of June 26,2000, NAFTA/UNC1TRAL Tribunal,
reprinted in 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 455, 479 (2000).
140. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR,
17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/$217 (1962) [hereinafter Resources Resolution].
141. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389, 489 (1977); Kuwait v. Aminoil,
66 I.L.R. 519, 601 (1982).
142. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 510; SHAW, supra note 98, at 744; REBECCA WALLACE,
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appropriate standard by which to judge whether expropriation is legitimate. 143
According to the Resolution, expropriation can be justified only if it is:
1) For a public purpose;
2) Provided for by law;
3) Non-discriminatory; and
4) Accompanied by adequate compensation. 44
All four conditions must be met. As the NIA does not satisfy these conditions,
it is illegal.
Discriminatory expropriation is illegal. 145 In Amoco International Finance
Corp. v. Iran, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal held that customary international
law prohibits discriminatory expropriation when there is not an objective and
reasonablejustification for the distinctions made. 46 The American Restatement
of the Law of Foreign Relations provides that an governmental act is
discriminatory if it is applied only to alien enterprises. 147 Expropriation is also
discriminatory if it is engaged in for extraneous political reasons. Thus, in
British Petroleum Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. v. Libya, the arbitrator
found Libya's nationalization law to be discriminatory because it was an act of
political retaliation against Britain.
41
Just as the nationalization in the British Petroleum case was targeted at a
specific company, the NIA effectively applies only to business concerns owned
by RU-based corporations. While the NIA refers to "recently privatized
business concerns,"'149 all such business concerns were privatized and purchased
by companies based within the RU.'5°  Furthermore, like the politically
retaliatory law in the British Petroleum case which was designed to expel the
British from Libya, the NIA was meant to punish the RU for its decision to
postpone Adaria's admission. The Adarian Parliament passed the NIA shortly
after its unsuccessful bid for RU membership and within days of Ambassador
Heep's arrest. The effect of the NIA has also been to encourage RU-based
corporations to leave Adaria. In this aspect alone, the NIA is illegal.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (4th ed., 2002).
143. OECD Doc. supra note 133, at 3; RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 712.
144. Resources Resolution, supra note 140.
145. OECD Doc., supra note 133, at 4; OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 920; SHAW, supra note 98,
at 751.
146. Amoco Int'l Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 139 (1987).
147. RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 712.
148. British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 297, 329 (1974). See also
Libyan-Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 62 I.L.R. 141, 194 (1977).
149. Compromis 35.
150. Compromis 20.
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Expropriation without "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation is
also illegal.15" ' The requirement to compensate is universally accepted and is
provided for in the Resources Resolution' as well as in the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.'53 National laws have also consistently
found compensation to be decisive in determining whether governmental
takings are illegal.5 4 In Libyan-American Oil Co. v. Libya, the arbitrator found
that the Libyan government had an obligation to compensate the applicant for
concession rights which it had nationalized.' Similarly, the arbitral tribunal
in Benvenuti v. Congo ordered the Congolese government to compensate the
applicants for nationalizing business concerns in which they had an interest.'56
Adaria has not provided any compensation to RU companies. In this regard, the
NIA is patently illegal.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request this
Honorable Court to find, adjudge, and declare as follows:
1) That the denial of Adaria's application to join the RU did not a
breach any international legal obligations owed to Adaria by
Respondents;
2) That Respondents may properly bring a claim for Adaria's
actions against the RU Legation, its property, and Ambassador
Heep;
3) That Adaria violated international law concerning the immunity
of diplomatic missions by seizing the premises, property, and
personnel of the RU Legation.
4) That the National Industry Act constitutes an illegal expropria-
tion of Respondents' nationals' property.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Respondents
151. See Amoco Int'l Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189,223 (1987); Am. Int'l
Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96, 105 (1983); OECD Doc., supra note 133, at 3; OPPENHEIM,
supra note 13, at 920; SHAW, supra note 98, at 743.
152. Resources Resolution, supra note 140.
153. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States art. 2(2), G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974); Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262;
American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; U.S. CONST. amend V.
154. WALLACE,supra note 142, at 191.
155. Libyan-Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 62 I.L.R. 141, 201 (1977).
156. Benvenuti v. Congo, 67 I.L.R. 345, 374 (1980). See also Sociedad Minera el Teniente SA v.
Norddeustsche Affinerie AG, 73 I.L.R. 230, 244-245 (1973).
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